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Abstract
This dissertation includes three chapters. The first chapter investigates the impact of
the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet normalization using a Bayesian vector autoregression
(BVAR) framework. I use counterfactual conditional forecasts to find that a reduction in
asset holdings down to a level where the federal funds market is active again will reducereal
GDP growth by an average of 0.18 percent per year and core inflation by a non-significant
average of 0.07 percent per year under Quantitative Tightening, relative to a scenario where
the Federal Reserve maintains a constant dollar amount of assets until 2024.
The second chapter models monetary policy using Taylor’s rule for the nominal interest-
rate target and examines the difference between the actual Federal Funds Rate and the Tay-
lor Rule model of behavior for distinct structural changes. Both a simple factor ANOVA
and regime switching methods find that there were “tight” or “loose” regimes in U.S. mon-
etary policy over the period 1965 to 2008. However, after accounting for the change in
inflation measurement from CPI to PCE and then core PCE after 2004, Alan Greenspan’s
tenure from 2003 to 2006 is consistent with his earlier symmetric deviations from the Tay-
lor Rule.
The final chapter examines the volatility of Bitcoin exchange rates which have gained
a great deal of attention since the creation of the currency. Standard measures of volatility
reflect the dramatic change in the Bitcoin/US dollar exchange rate, from about $0.05 USD
in 2010 to the neighborhood of $20,000 USD at the end of 2017, and down to around
ii
$5,000 USD in mid-2019. Characterizing the short-term and long-term volatility gives an
impression of the volatility of Bitcoin compared to other assets, as well as implying the
viability of Bitcoin as a medium of exchange and alternative asset.
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Chapter 1
Quantitative Tightening: What are the
macroeconomic consequences of
reducing the Federal Reserve Balance
Sheet?
1.1 Introduction
What effects will Quantitative Tightening (QT), or Reverse Quantitative Easing have on the
United States real economy and financial markets? If the U.S. Federal Reserve’s accumu-
lation of a massive quantity of assets had an expansionary effect on the real economy and
financial markets, will the plan to shrink the massive balance sheet have the opposite effect
on the real U.S. economy and financial markets?
For the Federal Reserve, the purpose of reducing security holdings is to eventually
reduce the reserve holdings of banks and other entities held at the Federal Reserve to a
level where overnight borrowings are needed by some entities to meet reserve require-
1
ments. Once this occurs, the federal funds rate will be the monetary policy instrument of
the FOMC, as it was prior to 2008. This balance sheet “normalization” of the conduct of
monetary policy will allow the Fed to discontinue the dual policy instrument structure it
has operated under since 2008. In the current monetary policy framework, both Interest
on Excess Reserves (IOER) and the level of security holdings are used to influence long-
term interest rates and (more importantly) portfolio flows from the Treasury market into
the private bond and equity markets (Minutes of the FOMC, July 29-30, 2014).
In this paper I create a regime dependent, Bayesian structural vector autoregressive
(VAR) model and forecast the differential outcome for real economy until December 2024,
conditional on the proposed path of asset reduction or a counterfactual policy of maintain-
ing a $4.2 trillion security holding portfolio. I find that reverse QE will result in an average
of 0.18 percent less real GDP growth per year until 2024, comparing the conditional point
forecasts for December 2024 to the forecast conditional on the Federal Reserve maintain-
ing a constant dollar value of asset holdings until 2024. However, for both perfect foresight
and structural forecasts, the average forecast difference is calculated from forecast variable
levels in December 2024. The results are unaffected by shocks to the path of reductions, so
long as the Federal Reserve still plans to normalize the balance sheet by the end of 2024.
1.2 Review of the Literature
1.2.1 Quantitative Easing
The Federal Reserve’s response to the 2008-2009 financial crisis included large-scale asset
purchases - buying government debt and mortgage backed securities (MBS) as a means
to provide continued stimulus after the Federal Funds rate had been reduced near zero in
November 2008. There are at least three possible mechanisms for the security purchases
2
in the bond market to affect the real economy: the portfolio balance channel, the signaling
channel, and the management of expectations about future economic outcomes. All of
the channels affect real GDP through a wealth effect. The intervention in the market for
government debt leads to higher private bond prices, as well as higher equity prices, and
those higher prices subsequently cause increased investment and consumption. Real GDP
may also be affected through private investment increases if the security purchases result
in lower long-term interest rates.
Vayanos and Vila (2009) provide the main theoretical rationale for the portfolio bal-
ance channel of QE. Their model is a no-arbitrage pricing framework for securities of
various maturities, accounting for the existence of investors, such as pension funds and in-
surance companies, who have an idiosyncratic demand for securities of specific maturities.
Yields on specific maturities depend partly on their relative supply. This implies that the
Fed can lower long-term interest rates, and push private investors into riskier asset classes
if it reduces the amount of long-term debt held by the private sector. Gorodnichenko and
Ray (2018) extend Vayanos and Vila (2009) to determine that QE programs primarily influ-
ence interest rates through this portfolio balance channel, and the combined effects of the
signaling channel and expectations channel were small. Furthermore, their results suggest
that QE programs can be effective in influencing interest rates at specific maturities when
financial markets are in crisis, but are less likely to be effective in normal times when the
arbitrageurs are more willing to assume risk and can effectively smooth the demand shocks
created by the Federal Reserve.
Eggertsson and Woodford (2004) show that in some New Keynesian models, QE can
work only through the signaling channel. The signaling channel consists of the Federal
Reserve communicating to market participants the Fed’s desire to hold short-term interest
rates low for a longer time. An expectation by market participants of lower future short-
term interest rates will also result in lower long-term rates, due to the term structure of
3
interest rates.
There exists a large literature on the effects of unconventional monetary policy on
financial markets, but empirical studies of the effect on output and inflation are much more
limited due to the difficulty involved.* Borio and Zubai (2016) provide an overview of
the empirical evidence of unconventional monetary policy’s effect on the real economy
and conclude that there is a positive effect on output and inflation from security purchase
programs, but the size and stability of the impact are uncertain.
Among the handful of studies using VARs, Baumeister and Benati (2013) provide
estimates of positive, significant macroeconomic impact of asset purchases in the United
States, United Kingdom, and the euro area due to the decrease in long-term bond spreads
following asset purchases. Using a time-varying parameter structural VAR, they find the
peak impact of large-scale asset purchases in the U.S. was a 0.9 percent increase in real
GDP and a 0.5 percent increase in inflation. Kapetanios et al. (2012) use a VAR counter-
factual to find that QE caused GDP in the United Kingdom to increases by 1.4 percent and
CPI Inflation to increase by 2.6 percent. Gambacorta et al. (2014) estimate a panel VAR
and find that an asset purchase shock increased GDP growth by 2 percent and inflation
increased by 2 percent at the maximum. Hausman and Wieland (2014) study QE in Japan
and find that the Bank of Japan policy contributed 1 percent to GDP growth in 2013.
The effect of the Fed’s asset purchase program on the U.S. is also covered from
a structural modeling perspective in Chung et al. (2011). Simulations from the Fed’s
FRB/US macroeconomic model suggest that the first round of QE asset purchases, initiated
in 2009, prevented deflation in the United States and reduced the rate of unemployment.
The authors conclude that the boost to the level of real GDP was about 3 percent, inflation
was 1 percent higher, and the unemployment rate was reduced by 1.5 percentage points,
*Krishnamurthey and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), Gagnon et al. (2011), and D’Amico et al. (2012) are
representative for the studies covering the financial markets in the United States.
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compared with what they would have been in 2011 without QE I. Engen, Laubach, and
Reifschneider (2015) also use structural simulations from the FRB/US model to assess
the economic stimulus from all three rounds of QE. They conclude that the effect of QE
on real GDP growth peaked in 2010, adding 1.2 percent. For inflation, they find the QE
impact peaked in 2016, adding 0.5 percent above the counterfactual scenario of no QE.
This paper is most closely related to Weale and Wieladek (2016). The authors use
a Bayesian VAR, fit with data from January 2009 to October 2014, to estimate the ex-post
effects of QE in the US and UK. They use an announcement series (where the full amount
of the QE program is assumed to enter the market at the beginning of each round of QE ) as
the policy variable in the VAR in order to better estimate the effects of QE in the forward-
looking bond and financial markets. They find that QE in the US resulted in an average
increase of 0.58 percent in GDP and 0.62 percent in inflation. The Bayesian VAR in their
study was fit using a non-informative prior on the autoregressive parameters and identifies
a monetary policy shock using four separate identification schemes. The reported impulse
effects are the average maximum impact of the QE shock.
1.2.2 Quantitative Tightening
As of July 2017, the security holdings of the Federal Reserve totaled $4.2 trillion dollars,
including approximately $3.5 trillion dollars of U.S. Treasury notes/bonds and $800 billion
dollars of mortgage-backed securities. Treasury holdings represent 15 percent of all Federal
outstanding debt, up from 7 percent of government debt in 2007. When a Treasury security
in the portfolio matures, the proceeds from the maturing bond is rolled over, i.e. reinvested
in the market for U.S. Treasuries. Rollovers in the System Open Market Account (SOMA)
are entered as noncompetitive bids and therefore do not affect the auction of the securities.
Noncompetitive bidders receive the stop-out rate, yield or discount margin determined by
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the competitive auction process. When the SOMA is awarded securities at auction, the
Treasury Department increases the total issue size by the amount of the SOMA’s award, so
reducing rollover purchases for the SOMA do not directly impact the price of a Treasury
Note or Bond issue.
The Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) statement on July 14, 2017 indicated
that it intends to “gradually reduce the Federal Reserve’s security holdings by decreasing
the [re]investment of the principal payments it receives from securities held in the System
Open Market Account.” The Committeegr adually reduced Treasury security holdings to
allow $6 billion per month to mature off the balance sheet, increasing maximums in steps
of $6 billion in three- month intervals until the max reduction was $30 billion per month.
Agency debt and mortgage-backed securities maximum caps were by $4 billion per month
initially and then increased in steps of $4 billion per month at three-month intervals until
the maximum reduction was $20 billion per month in October 2018 and thereafter. In
March 2019, the balance sheet reductions were slowed to $15 billion per month.
The purpose of reducing security holdings is to force reserve holdings of banks and
other entities held at the Federal Reserve to reach a level where overnight borrowings are
needed by some entities to meet their reserve requirements. Once this occurs, the federal
funds rate will be the monetary policy instrument of the FOMC, as it was prior to 2008.
This balance sheet “normalization” will allow the Fed to cease operating under a monetary
policy stance where interest on excess reserves is the short-term policy rate as opposed to
federal funds rate, and long-run interest rates can be influenced by security purchases as
well.
In an addendum to the July 2017 meeting of the FOMC, the committee projected
the range of reserve balances where the federal funds market will be active again (i.e. the
Federal Funds rate will be the primary monetary policy tool) to be between $600 billion and
$100 billion. Security holdings are to be reduced until the level of reserves is sufficiently
6
low that some banks have a shortage of reserves and reserve trading on the Federal Funds
market will resume. Asset holdings will begin to rise again at the same rate of currency
in circulation (Figure 1.1). The projected security holdings paths to the upper and lower
bounds of the range were published along with the addendum, providing the necessary
future policy to condition forecasts upon.
The path represents the maxiumum rate at which the balance sheet will be reduced.
Events such as the March 2019 announcement that the balance sheet reduction would be
put on hold in September 2019 can be interpreted as a shock to expectations, increasing
the relevance of the structural forecast inference prior to December 2024. However, the
forecast differences of primary interest in this paper only depend on the Federal Reserve’s
commitment to a level of assets in December 2024, and not on the particular path of security
holdings.
Figure 1.1: Federal Reserve Balance Sheet Trends
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Notes: The figure shows the paths of select U.S. Federal Reserve balance sheet components since January
2006, along with the proposed maximum security holding reduction paths and the future path currency in
circulation implied by a 7 percent annual growth rate. The goal of the reduction in security holdings is a
balance sheet where between $600 Billion and $100 Billion in reserves (Reverse QE I and Reverse QE II) are
held at the Fed. This is the reserve balance range where it is believed that an overnight market for reserves
will exist as it did before the financial crisis. The predicted growth in currency in circulation will allow
security holdings to begin increasing again sometime after 2021 while reserve balances remain within the
desired range.
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While there is a lack of any similar historical experience to reverse QE, Gorod-
nichenko and Ray (2018) suggest that the effect of demand shocks on the bond market
are diminished during “normal” circumstances due to the decreased risk aversion of arbi-
trageurs. In addition, the Treasury has attempted to allocate its rollover purchases in equal
proportions across the yield curve as opposed to purchasing one specific maturity - a strat-
egy which the authors find further diminishes the impact of demand shock on preferred
habit investors. Their results suggest that reverse QE can have less impact on the real econ-
omy than the original rounds of large-scale asset purchases, although the negative impact
could still be substantial. This result seems at odds with the long-run neutrality of money,
as it suggests QE resulted in a permanent increase in real GDP and the price level.
This paper goes beyond the current literature by conditionally forecasting the relative
effect of the real economy of Reverse QE (Quantitative Tightening). I use an asymmetric
extension of the Weale and Wieladek (2016) VAR in order to take advantage of data avail-
able outside of the period from 2009 to October 2014 to create counterfactual, conditional
forecasts for the real economy from January 2018 to December 2024. Federal Reserve
security holdings is used as the QE variable, as suggested by Bhattari et al. (2015). Since
security holdings, as a percentage of nominal GDP, have actually been declining since Oc-
tober 2014, I have some information on the effects of security holdings after the reversal
of their upward trend if I use security holdings as a proportion of nominal GDP as my QE
variable. The interest rate on excess reserves (IOER) is also included as a variable in my
model, due to its increasing relevance as the short term policy interest rate. Focusing on
the counterfactual difference in the forecast allows for the use of long-term structural time
series forecasting methods without additional information on future trade or fiscal policy
needing to be being included in the model.
Using security holdings as the QE policy variable explicitly recognizes that the
primary influence of security holding changes on the real economy comes through the
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private capital flows it causes to come out of the Treasury and MBS markets and into the
private bonds and equity markets (the Portfolio Balance Channel) rather than an interest
rate channel. If forecasting reverse QE’s effect forward-looking variables such as Treasury
yields and equity prices were the primary concern of this paper, an announcement series as
the policy variable would be more useful.
Since I use counterfactual forecasts and focusing on the difference in effect Quantitative
Tightening has on the level of real GDP and core PCE, I am not concerned with includ-
ing variables other than those in the structural model for forecasting since their impact is
differenced away.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 describes the state-dependent
VAR and identification strategies. Section 4 describes the VAR parameter estimation, as
well as the conditional forecast methodology. Section 5 analyses the results of the condi-
tional forecasts under the different parameter and identification combinations and Section
6 concludes.
1.3 Empirical Approach
Given that reverse QE implies a break in the trend of security holdings that will not be
opposite in scale of the original large-scale asset purchase program, it necessary to use a
VAR that is dependent on the state of unconventional monetary policy. Only using data
from the post-QE period would both likely result in very imprecise effect estimates, given
the small sample size. A VAR dependent on policy state of QE (when QE is occurring vs.
not occurring) allows the use of data from the period of the financial crisis until December
2017. I specify the model as
A0Yt = αc+
p∑
i=1
AiYt−i+
p∑
i=1
γi(Ysec,t−i ∗ It−i)+γI XIOER,t+ et, et ∼ N(0,Σ) (1.1)
9
where
It =

1 if t ∈ QE period
0 if t ∈ Non-QE period.
(1.2)
In Equation (1.1), the vector Yt = [Real GDP (yt), Personal Consumption Expendi-
ture less food and energy (pit), Fed Securities/Nominal GDP (sect), U.S. 10-year Treasury
yield (it), and the real S&P 500 index (spt)]. All variables, except for the Federal Reserve
security holdings as a percentage of the nominal economy (sect) and the 10-year Trea-
sury Yield (it), are in log levels†. The data are monthly observations beginning in January
2007 (the beginning of the financial crisis) and ending in December 2017 (T=132). All
macroeconomic variables, except monthly real and nominal GDP were taken from the St.
Louis Federal Reserve’s FRED database. Monthly real and nominal GDP come from the
Macroeconomic Advisors approximation method. A summary of the data sources can be
found in the Appendix.
The second policy instrument, IOER (XIOER), enters the model contemporaneously
as an exogenous variable due to the lack of variation in the administratively set rate. To
extend the IOER variable back to 2007, it is necessary to concatenate IOER with the Fed-
eral Funds rate for the period from January 2007 to October 2008, when the Fed began
paying interest on excess reserves. The peak of the financial crisis occurred during those
21 months from January 2007 to October 2008, and the Federal Reserve rapidly decreased
the Fed Funds rate toward zero from 5.25 percent (Figure 1.2). I find no statistical justifi-
cation to include lagged values of the interest rate in the VAR, even when I include the 21
†Sims, Stock and Watson (1990) point out that attempting to transform models to stationary form by
difference or cointegration is often unnecessary. Differencing or including a deterministic time trend is par-
ticularly undesirable when using a multivariate time series model for long-run forecasting.
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Figure 1.2: Monetary Policy Instruments
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Notes: The figure shows the path of Interest on Excess Reserves (IOER), as well as the Federal
Reserve’s communicated path of the policy interest rate from 2018 - 2024 . Prior to October 2008,
the policy rate is the Federal Funds rate.
observations prior to October 2008 in the sample, due to the lack of monthly variation ‡.
Including other exogenous variables that might be useful for making a long term GDP or
inflation forecast is undesirable since the focus of this analysis is a counterfactual forecast
with a structural model of monetary policy. I make no attempt to make a long-term forecast
of the level of GDP in 2024.
Simply using the absolute level of asset holdings as the policy variable in the VAR
overstates the negative impact and relative importance of security holdings since, until De-
cember 2017, Federal Reserve security holdings had only ever risen or stayed constant.
Also Treasury asset holdings, as a percentage of contemporaneous nominal output, have
actually been declining since October 2014 (Figure 1.3). This period of “Post-QE” created
38 monthly observations, from October 2014 to December 2017, where the U.S. economic
conditions should be similar to the economic environment during the future period of re-
‡The optimal lag length of Equation (1.1) is determined by a majority vote of the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) , Hannan-Quinn (HQ) criterion, Bayes-Schwartz Information Criterion (BIC). Using the
OLS/MLE estimates of Equation (1.1), two lags (p = 2) is considered the optimal model by the majority of
information criterion for the sample of 2007-2017. The HQ and BIC criterion both select two lags. The HQ
criterion selects a two lag VAR if the sample is truncated to begin 2009 or 2010, as does the AIC criterion.
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verse QE. The QE period, delineated by the indicator function in Equation (2), lasts from
January 2009 to October 2014.
Figure 1.3: Securities Held Outright as a proportion of nominal GDP
2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
QE I QE II QE III
Post−QE
October 2014
Notes: The figure shows the proposed paths of the U.S. Federal Reserve’s asset holdings since January
2007 as a percentage of nominal GDP. As a percentage of nominal GDP, asset holdings begin declining in
November 2014 as soon as asset purchases ceased, providing a 38-month period of observations useful in
forecasting the macroeconomic impact of further reductions in Federal Reserve asset holdings.
Evidence in favor of the state-dependent VAR comes from the approach to testing for
symmetry described in Cover (1992), which involves testing whether the OLS coefficients
γ1,γ2 in Equation (1.1) are jointly significant. Table 1 shows that the null hypothesis of
symmetry is rejected at the 95 percent level regardless of whether the standard likelihood
ratio test statistic or the test statistic correct for small sample bias was used.
The state-dependent autoregressive terms for asset holdings appear to have minimal
impact on the calculated impulse responses, as can be seen by fitting the model with as
Minnesota prior in Figure 1.7 §. Although there is little difference in the impulse responses
in the QE vs. non-QE state, the trend in security holdings as a percentage of nominal GDP
clearly shifts after October 2014, and asymmetric coefficients are required.
§In Equation (1.1), the coefficient on the interaction variable, γ, captures the asymmetric response of Fed
asset holding increases.
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1.3.1 Identification
When forecasting with the assumption that constant monetary policy shocks are affecting
the economy, it is necessary to be able identify the individual shocks j,t from the reduced
form residuals ej,t. This requires either imposing structural restrictions on A0 in Equation
(1.1) directly, where A−10 ej,t = j,t, or inferring restrictions on A0 from sign restrictions
Table 1.1: OLS Estimation: Non-Linear Coefficients
2007-2017 GDP PCE-X Fed Assets 10 Year S&P500
Securities/GDPt−1 -0.4814 0.0386 1.8495 0.1629 4.6057
Securities/GDPt−1 ∗ It1 -0.0245 0.0055 0.0144 0.0072 -0.0816
Securities/GDPt−2 0.5207 -0.0038 -0.8639 -0.1802 -4.0975
Securities/GDPt−2 ∗ It2 -0.0019 -0.0020 0.0008 -0.0111 0.1660
LR = 19.118
2009-2017 GDP PCE-X Fed Assets 10 Year S&P500
Securities/GDPt−1 0.0026 0.0556 1.5772 0.2910 6.1857
Securities/GDPt−1 ∗ It1 -0.0244 0.0024 0.0095 0.0073 -0.0815
Securities/GDPt−2 0.1696 -0.0523 -0.7101 -0.2951 -5.5596
Securities/GDPt−2 ∗ It2 -0.0041 -0.0017 0.0042 -0.0075 0.1693
LR = 26.036
2010-2017 GDP PCE-X Fed Assets 10 Year S&P500
Securities/GDPt−1 -0.3159 -0.025 1.7254 0.2688 7.4405
Securities/GDPt−1 ∗ It1 0.0021 0.0101 0.0063 0.0073 -0.0967
Securities/GDPt−2 0.5050 -0.0387 -0.8203 -0.2866 -6.6273
Securities/GDPt−2 ∗ It2 -0.0016 -0.0017 0.0022 -0.0053 0.1730
LR = 22.297
To estimate the impulse responses of an asset purchase the shock in a quantitative easing regime, the Ai
endogenous coefficient matrix must include AS/GDP,i + γi, (adding the coefficients of the together), for
i = 1, 2. For a single lag (p = 1) version of Equation (1.1), write the model as
A0Yt = αc + A1Yt−1 + γ1Yt−1It−1) + et (1.3)
Yt = A−10 αc + A
−1
0 (A1 + γ1It−1)Yt−1 + A
−1
0 et (1.4)
where y and e are p × 1 vectors. The impulse response at horizon h of the variables to an exogenous shock
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placed on the impulse responses, as in Uhlig (2005) or Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner and
Zha (2010). The simplest approach of imposing restrictions on A0 directly is to use the
Cholesky decomposition of Σˆ, to find A0, since A−10 (A
−1
0 )
′ = Σˆ. This is equivalent to
imposing recursive restrictions on A0 . A non-recursive identification for a system would
potentially be useful, but since Waggoner and Zha (1999) show that structural VAR fore-
casts are equivalent for any just-identified A0 and forecasts from the VAR are my primary
interest, I do not entertain other non-Cholesky short-run identification strategies or alter-
native orderings. Reversing the order of the fast-moving variables, equities and long-term
interest rates, did not affect the results for the structural forecasts. For the 2007-2017 sam-
ple,
A0Yt =

1 0 0 0 0
0.018 1 0 0 0
−0.158 −0.018 1 0 0
0.094 −0.405 0.198 1 0
2.360 −3.359 1.585 4.618 1


yt
pit
sect
it
spt
 .
The recursive ordering implies that output and prices react with a lag to any asset
purchases shock, while asset purchases can impact bond yields and equity prices contem-
poraneously. The structure also implies that shocks from the market for 10-year Treasury
bonds can affect the equity market contemporaneously, but shocks from the equity market
to variable j is then
∂Yt+h
∂ej,t
=
∂
∂ej,t
{
A−10 αc + A
−1
0 (A1 + γ1I1)Yt+h−1 + A
−1
0 et+h−1
}
= . . . (1.5)
=
∂
∂ej,t
{
(A−10 A1 + A
−1
0 γ1I1)
iYt + A−10
h∑
i=0
(A−10 A1 + A
−1
0 γ1I1)
iet+h−i
}
(1.6)
=
∂
∂ej,t
{
(A−10 A1 + A
−1
0 γ1I1)
hA−10 et
}
(1.7)
= (A−10 A1 + A
−1
0 γ1I1)
hA−10 ej (1.8)
where ej is the jth row of the p identity matrix. That is, the response of all p variables at horizon h to a shock
to variable j is the jth column of (A−10 A1 + A
−1
0 γI1)
h.
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cannot affect the bond market within the same month. While it obviously would be ideal for
both “fast-moving” variables to transmit shocks to one another, this ordering represents the
causal structure of the portfolio balance channel, and real equity shocks are not of primary
interest.
Alternatively, Faust (1998), Canova and De Nicolo (2002), Uhlig (2005), and Rubio-
Ramirez, Waggoner and Zha (2010), show that identification of structural shocks in VAR
models can be based on prior beliefs about the signs of the impact of a certain shock.
As Uhlig (2017) explains, sign identification is achieved through restrictions on A−10 , as
opposed to A0 in traditional identification. The restrictions impose prior beliefs on impulse
responses, in the form of “a shock to variable x results in a decrease in variable y for at
least 5 months”. An advantage of sign identification is that, for VARs that include multiple
fast-moving financial variables, the financial variables can transmit shocks to one another
within the time unit of observation. Partial identification by sign restriction eliminates the
assumption in the recursive ordering that stock prices cannot impact bond yields within
the same month, as well the always controversial restriction on the policy variable being
unable to affect contemporaneous prices.
While a VAR identified by sign restriction relaxes the exclusion restrictions in the re-
cursively identified model, previously unrestricted parameters in A−10 are restricted instead,
so the recursive model is not nested within the sign-identified model. The two approaches
represent alternatives, as it is not possible to validate or invalidate the implications of a
recursively identified VAR with a sign-identified VAR model.
In this paper only a single structural shock, the security reduction shock, is of in-
terest. For the five-variable model here, the shock is defined by a restriction that a decline
in Federal Reserve Assets for one quarter results in a contemporaneous decline in equity
prices, as well being unable to affect real GDP or prices for the first month. Table 3.1
summarizes this combination of sign and zero restrictions over the three-month time hori-
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zon. In this case, the set of sign restrictions impose weaker identification restrictions than
Table 1.2: Security Purchase Shock Sign Restrictions
Variable K=t+0 K=t+1 K=t+2 K=t+3
Real GDP 0 . . .
Core PCE 0 . . .
Securities/GDP < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0
10-year yield . . . .
S&P 500 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0
the baseline Cholesky ordering. This results in less precise posterior inference for the im-
pulse responses and the structural forecasts with the asset reduction shocks identified in this
manner, although the median forecasts are similar to structural forecasts using a Cholesky
ordering.
1.4 Estimation and Inference
The stacked system linear system for Equation (1.1) is
Y = XB + A−10 e, (1.10)
where
X = [Yt−1, Yt−2, Ys,t−1 ∗ It−1, Ys,t−2 ∗ It−2, XIOER,t, 1],
and
B = [A−10 At−1,A
−1
0 At−2,A
−1
0 γ1,A
−1
0 γ2,A
−1
0 γIOER,t,A
−1
0 αc]
′.
The parameters of the VAR are estimated using the Bayesian approach with either
a non-informative prior, or a with Minnesota-type prior¶. Using a non-informative prior
¶In the VAR forecasting literature, it is generally more common to use models with parameters estimated
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allows for Bayesian inference, but produces median posterior parameter estimates similar
to OLS.
The critical advantage of the Bayesian approach is that it is possible to formally and
transparently bring to bear information on what constitutes reasonable estimates for model
parameters. For such an information-bearing prior on the autoregressive parameters, I use
a version of the Minnesota prior, as described in the Online Appendix G. The original
Minnesota prior from Doan, Litterman, and Sims (1984), or Litterman (1986) shrinks the
VAR parameter estimates toward multivariate random walks since it specifies the prior
mean of the first lag of the dependent variable to one, and sets the prior mean of all other
slope coefficients to zero. So, if the prior means were the true parameter values, each
variable would follow a random walk (a no-change forecast).
A reasonable prior belief is that the impulse response of real GDP to a monetary
policy shock should be hump-shaped, with a maximum impulse similar in magnitude to
the range outlined in the QE literature (i.e. the range from Borio and Zubai, 2016), and so
the hyperparameters are set to be λ = 2.75 and µ = 0.001 (using the Minnesota/dummy
variable prior parameterization outlined in Lubik and Schorfheide,2005)) in order to repli-
cate a 0.58 percent maximum impact of a 1 percent asset purchase shock on real GDP. This
results in a forecast for the effects of the reduction in the balance sheet on real GDP and
inflation that is calibrated by the literature estimates for the effects of QE I-III.
by an informative (usually a Minnesota type) prior, since studies such as Banbura, Giannone, and Reichlin
(2010) and Wright (2012) have shown forecasts are often more accurate than using an OLS-estimated VAR.
These forecasting accuracy gains increase as the model grows larger. However, Baumeister and Kilian (2012)
do provide an example of OLS-estimated VAR forecasts having smaller prediction errors than a Bayesian
VAR, so it useful to forecast with both non-informative and informative priors.
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1.4.1 Counterfactual Forecasting
The VAR in Equation (1.1) is intended to estimate the impact of shocks to the level of
Federal Reserve asset holdings have on real GDP and inflation. Counterfactual conditional
forecasts illuminate the relative difference in the outcome from different paths of policy
variables. I compare the difference in the forecasts for the U.S. real economy conditional
on the proposed reduction in the level of the Federal Reserve security holdings from Jan-
uary 2018 to December 2024, and the forecasts conditional on a policy of maintaining
Federal Reserve security holdings at 4.2 trillion dollars for the same period. There are also
two distinct conditional forecasting methods, one where the Federal Reserve’s proposed
security holding estimates as a proportionof nominal GDP are assumed to be credible at all
future dates, and one where it is not. In all cases, the path of Federal Reserve short interest
rates (XIOER,t+K) is assumed to be exogenous and known, since the Federal Reserve has
been consistent in signaling the future path of the short rates and has published the expected
path of short rates (Figure 1.2). The conditional forecasts also require knowledge of future
U.S. nominal GDP (since the conditioning variable is the path of security holdings as a pro-
portion of nominal GDP). I approximate nominal GDP by using the nominal GDP implied
by the real GDP and core PCE forecasts from the previous iteration of Gibbs sampler.
Conditioning-on-observables (Antolin-Diaz, Petrella, and Rubio-Ramirez, 2018)
forecasting assumes no structural shocks affect the economic forecasts. This is equivalent
to assuming that the Fed’s proposed path of security holdings is considered completely
credible by economic agents in the U.S. and no monthly reduction will constitute a policy
surprise, similar to a perfect foresight assumption in a recursive model representative agent
model. This assumption substantially narrows the bounds on the conditional forecasts, as
the only source future uncertainty comes from the estimated VAR parameters. Conditional
forecasts for a credible Federal Reserve are calculated where Ysec,t+K ,Ysec,t+K−1 known
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for all K. Bayesian credible regions constructed as in Banbura et al. (2015). Assuming the
proposed future path of security holdings is completely credible substantially narrows the
bounds on the conditional forecasts.
The second type of conditional forecasting method allows for structural shocks
to affect the conditional forecasts, so esec,t+K is now constrained, rather than assuming
Ysec,t+K ,Ysec,t+K−1 is known for all future periods. The difference between the uncondi-
tional forecast of Fed security holdings and the proposed path of security holdings at time
t+K constitutes a constraint, r, on the innovations, esec,t+K . This can be expressed as
R esec = r, (1.11)
where r is a (M x K) x 1 vector. M = 1 is the number of constrained variables (Federal
Reserve securities as a percentage of nominal GDP) and K = 84 denotes the number of
periods the constraint is applied. The elements of the vector r consist of the known future
path for securities minus the unconditional forecast of security holdings at time t +K. R
is a matrix of dimensions (M x K) x (N x K). The elements of this matrix are the impulse
responses of the constrained variables to the structural shocks at horizon 1, 2, . . . , K. The
(N x K) x 1 vector e contains the constrained future shocks. Doan et al. (1983) shows that
the least squares solution for the constrained innovations is given as
ˆesec = R
′(R′R)−1r. (1.12)
With these constrained shocks ˆesec in hand||, the conditional forecasts can be calculated.
||Doan et al. (1984) arrives at this result under the assumption that model in 1.1 is stationary, but the
stationarity assumption is not required for the distributional result in Waggoner and Zha (1999).
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Waggoner and Zha (1999) find that the restricted future shocks e are distributed as
ˆesec ∼ N(R′(R′R)−1r, I −R′(R′R)−1R), (1.13)
allowing for the creation of posterior density regions around the conditional forecasts. Wag-
goner and Zha’s (1999) Gibbs sampling algorithm is used to generate the forecast credible
distribution**.
This second type of conditional forecast is equivalent to assuming that the Fed’s
proposed path of security holdings is non-credible for economic agents, and every monthly
reduction will constitute a policy surprise. This substantially increases the imprecision of
the conditional forecasts. I consider the two conditional forecasting methods to provide
the lower and upper bounds, respectively, on the width of the credible intervals around
the conditional forecasts. Antolin-Diaz, Petrella, and Rubio-Ramirez (2018) extends Wag-
goner and Zha (1999) to allow for the possibility of conducting inference when only one of
the structural shocks (in this case Fed security holdings) is identified using sign restriction.
Partial identification of A0 is an attractive procedure, since I am only interested in an asset
purchase shock, but it comes at the cost of wider forecast posterior density intervals due
to the wider range of shocks which are allowed to affect the forecast. The algorithm is
described in the Appendix.
1.5 Results
Table 1.3 shows the forecast differences in the annualized growth rates for the VAR en-
dogenous variables between the Federal Reserve counterfactual security holding paths, i.e.
**Waggoner and Zha (1999) show that the conditional forecasts when the Fed is considered non-credible
are the same regardless of A0 being just-identified using a recursive Cholesky ordering, or just-identified
using a non-recursive ordering.
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Table 1.3: Reverse QE I 2018-2024 Annualized Median Differential Effects: 2007-2017
sample
Parameter Prior & identification Real GDP Core PCE 10YR S&P 500
Perfect Foresight
Minnesota Prior -0.22 -0.07 0.26 -2.33
[-0.25, -0.19] [-0.10, -0.05] [0.17, 0.37] [-2.53, -2.10]
Jeffrey’s Non-Informative Prior -0.40 -0.24 0.21 -3.11
[-0.42, -0.38] [-0.25, -0.23] [0.14, 0.29] [-3.27, -2.92]
Structural
Minnesota Prior, recursive -0.14 -0.06 -0.04 -1.73
[-0.62, 0.32] [-0.43, 0.31] [-1.18, 1.08] [-5.05, 0.99]
Jeffrey’s Prior, recursive -0.42 -0.28 0.26 -2.96
[-0.85, -0.01] [-0.63, 0.05] [-0.88, 1.47] [-6.32, -0.03]
Jeffrey’s Prior, Sign identification -0.47 -0.32 0.34 -2.79
[-1.01, 0.04] [-0.82, 0.17] [-0.96, 1.68] [-8.10, 1.36]
Minnesota Prior Mean Difference -0.18 -0.06 0.11 -2.03
[-0.44, 0.06] [-0.27, 0.13] [-0.51, 0.73] [-3.79, 0.56]
Notes: The first value represents the differential in the compound annual percent growth rate between the
forecast with a constant asset policy and Reverse QE I implied by the median forecasts for December 2024.
The bracketed values are the 90 percent posterior for the annualized forecast differential. The first two mod-
els conditionally forecast the four variables of interest with the assumption that the future Securities Held
Outright levels are a fixed commitment by the Federal Reserve. The last three models conduct conditional
forecast inference using structural forecast error restriction, which in this application is equivalent to assum-
ing the Federal Reserve’s projected path of Quantitative Tightening is non-credible.
a constant 4.2 trillion dollar security level and the proposed path of security holding reduc-
tion resulting in approximately 600 billion dollars of reserve balances (the more optimistic
level of reserves which results in a functioning Federal Funds market). Table 1.4 in the
Appendix shows the forecast differences in the annualized growth rates between the con-
stant 4.2 trillion dollar security level and the proposed path of security holding reduction
resulting in ∼ 100 billion dollars of reserve balances (Reverse QE II) for each forecasting
method.
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Figure 1.4: Perfect Foresight Conditional Forecasts: 2007-2017 sample
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Notes: The figure shows, for each of the endogenous variables in the model, the median forecast and 90
percent Bayesian credible set from January 2018 - December 2024 for a constant asset level policy (blue)
and Reverse QE I (red) under four combinations of parameter priors and forecast error assumptions. The
forecasts are conditional on both the Federal Reseve forecast of Interest Rate on Excess Reserves and the
potential paths of the series starting points.
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Though future nominal GDP was approximated in each Gibbs sampler iteration by
the prior iteration’s forecasts for real GDP and core PCE, there is little fluctuation the path
of nominal GDP (and thus little uncertainty in the conditional variable of Fed Assets as
a percentage of nominal GDP) due to the inflation-output tradeoff that is present in the
forecasts (Figure 1.4).
The credibility of the Federal Reserve’s commitment to the eventual conclusion of
security reductions in 2024 and the momentum of economic growth play a large role in
the level of certainty attached to the differential growth estimates as the results in Table
1.3 show. The main results are illustrated in Figures 1.4 and 1.5. Figure 1.4 shows the
raw conditional forecast paths of real GDP, core PCE, U.S. 10-year Treasury yield and the
real S&P 500 index for Reverse QE I and the alternative constant security level policy the
various forecast methods.
The prior calibrated for the level of QE impact finds a small effect for the Quanti-
tative Tightening. The forecast differences using the calibrated prior constitute the main re-
sult. These estimates are contrasted with growth difference estimates using a non-informative
prior in Table 1.3. The average difference in real GDP and inflation are invariably larger
when using a non-informative parameter prior. In general, forecast uncertainty increases
substantially when asset purchase shocks are assumed to affect the forecast (the security
holding reductions are a constant surprise) by design in structural forecasting, but the me-
dian forecast differences are similar to those to conditioning-on-observable forecasts. Fig-
ure 1.5 displays the counterfactual forecasts of real GDP and core PCE, along with the
posterior density for the differences in real GDP and core PCE.
Despite the obvious divergence in precision across the perfect foresight and condi-
tional forecasts, there is consistency in the median differences across the perfect foresight
and structural methods using the same parameter prior, as Table 1.3 and Figure 1.5 show.
December 2024 real GDP has a high probability (greater than 85 percent) of being less than
23
the counterfactual based on the posterior forecast density.
The forecasts with partial shock identification produce median counterfactual differ-
ences similar to the recursively identified shocks with non-informative parameter priors††.
Figures 1.4 and 1.5 display the structural forecasts using sign restriction.
1.5.1 Robustness
I examine sample robustness by truncating the sample to begin in either 2009 or 2010
(at the beginning of QE and after the first round of QE). Although the forecast difference
uncertainty increases with smaller sample sizes, the model average difference between the
counterfactuals remains similar for real GDP and core PCE. The results from the truncated
samples are found in the Online Appendix.
††As Baumeister and Hamilton (2015), sign-identified VARs can only use a non-informative parameter
prior distribution.
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Figure 1.5: Perfect Foresight Output and Inflation Conditional Forecasts: 2007-2017 sam-
ple
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Structural Output and Inflation Conditional Forecasts
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The first two panels of each row the figure shows the median forecast and 90 percent Bayesian credible
set for output and inflation from January 2018 - December 2024 using either a Minnesota Prior or Jeffrey’s
non-informative prior for the autoregressive parameters under the constant asset policy (blue) or Reverse QE I
(red). The right two panels show the percent difference in the forecast levels of real GDP and PCE-X between
a Federal Reserve constant asset policy and Reverse QE I, calculated from the point forecasts in the first two
panels. The bands in the right two panels show the 90 percent credible set for the forecast differences.
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1.6 Conclusion
The results in this paper are the first to imply that the policy of reducing the security hold-
ings of the Federal Reserve will contribute an additional source of fluctuation in the real
GDP level from 2018-2024. Across Minnesota and non-informative prior using perfect
foresight forecast, I find that actively reducing the security holdings the Federal Reserve
will result in a median 1.35 percent decline inreal GDP iby 2024, an average of 0.18 percent
less real GDP growth per year, relative to a constant balance sheet policy. This is the com-
bined posterior of the calibrated prior across the perfect foresight and structural difference
distributions. Core PCE only declines 0.07 percent per year on average, and there is more
uncertainty in the estimate to the extent that the true effect is likely close to zero. This small
effect on inflation is possibly a reflection of the lack of loan growth (broad money growth)
promoted by QE. The counterfactual real GDP difference is somewhat less uncertain that
of the core PCE difference across the possible future asset holding scenarios.
For the less optimistic path of security holdings, where the Federal Funds market
becomes active again when there are approximately 100 billion dollars of reserves (Reverse
QE II), I find that reducing security holdings of the Federal Reserve will result in a level
of real GDP in 2024 that implies 0.26 percent less real GDP growth per year from on
average until 2024 (Table 1.4), if the Federal Reserve reduces assets to $100 billion in
reserves. Again, this is relative to the real GDP growth forecast to occur under a policy of
maintaining a constant level of assets and allowing security holdings to decline only as a
percentage of U.S. nominal GDP. Core PCE is forecast to grow 0.09 percent less per year
than under the counterfactual with the calibrated Minnesota Prior. There is also a higher
degree of uncertainty under the larger asset reduction scenario, as Table 1.4 shows.
No scenario for the reduction in security holdings results in a permanent reduction
in real GDP - if the trend of security holdings seen in figure 1.2 is extended past December
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2024 to allow for a longer conditional forecast. For any forecasting procedure, the forecast
level of real GDP is, eventually, not significantly different from the counterfactual level of
real GDP. However, I do not attempt to forecast the date of re-convergence of the real GDP
level between the two policy alternatives.
The results have obvious implications for Federal Reserve balance sheet actions. Nor-
malizing the balance sheet over a longer time horizon will decrease the average yearly
effect on real GDP, and vis-versa. The effect of balance sheet normalization on the price
level is more uncertain, but there is a lower probability that it will result in a noticeable
effect on inflation. The balance sheet will continue to be monetary policy instrument for
the foreseeable future.
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1.7 Appendix
Figure 1.6: The Data
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Notes: The figure shows the data series used in the VAR model of the U.S.
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Algorithm for Conditional Forecasting with a Sign-identified SVAR
(Antolin, Petrella, and Rubio-Ramirez 2018)
Initialize yT+h,(0) = [yT , y(0)T+1,T+h].
1. Conditioning on yT+,(i−1) = [yT , y(i−1)T+1,T+h], draw (B
(i),Σ(i)).
2. Make M draws of the impulse vector, Q(i).
3. Keep a triplet of (B(i),Σ(i),Q(i,m)) which satifies the sign and zero restrictions.
Call it (B(i),Σ(i),Qi)
4. Conditioning on (B(i),Σ(i),Qi) and yT , draw y(i)T+1,T+h.
5. Return to Step 1 until the required number of draws has been obtained.
-In this application, since nominal GDP necessary to find the ratio of Federal Reserve assets to
nominal GDP (the conditioning variable), nominal GDP is estimated based on the forecasts of real
GDP and core PCE. An initial estimate of the nominal GDP series is used to initialize y(0)T+1,T+h.
Then in Step 4, y(i)T+1,T+h is made conditional on the estimate of nominal GDP based on the real
GDP and core PCE from y(i−1)T+1,T+h.
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Variable Source Transformation
Real GDP Monthly U.S. GDP from Macroeco-
nomic Advisers.
log(GDPt)× 100
Core PCE Monthly Personal Consumption Ex-
penditure excluding food and energy
index from FRED (PCEPILFE).
log(PCEXt)× 100
Asset Pur-
chases
Ratio of Securities Held Outright
by the Federal Reserve from FRED
(WSECOUT) to Nominal GDP from
Macroeconomic Advisors.
(Assetst/NGDPt)×100
Asset Levels
2018-2024
Ratio of Federal Reserve forecasted
Security Open Market Account levels
(SOMA1 and SOMA2) to trend Nomi-
nal GDP (trend between January 2015
and December 2017).
(Assetst/NGDPt)×100
10-year
yield
Constant maturity yield on 10-year
U.S. Treasury Bonds from FRED
(WGS10YR).
None
Real S&P
500
Last monthly S&P 500 index value
from Yahoo Finance (GSPC).
log(SP500t/PCEXt)×
100
Opportunity
Cost of
Reserves
Interest on Excess Reserves from
FRED (IOER). Federal Funds rate
prior to October 2008 (FEDFUNDS).
None
Future IOER Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
forecast of future IOER.
None
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Figure 1.7: Asymmetric Impact of 1% Decline in Assets/GDP Ratio
 Real GDP (log units x 100)
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Notes: This figure shows, for each of the variables in the model, the median impulse responses in response
to an unexpected 1% asset purchase announcement as a fraction of contemporaneous Nominal GDP, together
with 90% Bayesian credible sets. I show results for all three data starting points for the United States,
each with the same Minnesota Prior hyperparameters. 10,000 Monte Carlo draws were used to generate the
responses. The horizontal axis indicates the number of monthly time periods since the announcement. The
prior hyperparameters were chosen to replicate a 0.58% maximum impact on Real GDP of the 1% asset
purchases announcement for the dataset starting in 2009.
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Table 1.4: Reverse QE II 2018-2024 Annualized Differential Effects: 2007-2017 sample
Parameter Prior & Identification Real GDP Core PCE 10YR S&P 500
Perfect Foresight
Minnesota Prior -0.31 -0.10 0.35 -3.42
[-0.34, -0.27] [-0.12, -0.06] [0.27, 0.43] [-3.62, -3.20]
Jeffrey’s Non-Informative Prior -0.53 -0.31 0.29 -4.59
[-0.55, -0.51] [-0.33, -0.29] [0.22, 0.37] [-4.77, -4.37]
Structural
Minnesota Prior, recursive -0.21 -0.08 -0.06 -2.56
[-0.68, 0.26] [-0.45, 0.31] [-1.18, 1.13] [-6.05, 0.41]
Jeffrey’s Prior, recursive -0.54 -0.35 0.32 -4.19
[-0.98, -0.12] [-0.70, -0.01] [-0.84, 1.48] [-8.08, -1.03]
Jeffrey’s Prior, Sign identification -0.52 -0.29 -0.00 -4.07
[-1.75, 0.52] [-1.29, 0.59] [-1.56, 1.68] [-14.21, 1.72]
Minnesota Prior Mean Difference -0.26 -0.09 0.15 -2.99
[-0.51, -0.01] [-0.29, 0.13] [-0.46, 0.78] [-4.84, 1.40]
Note: The first value represents the differential in the compound annual percent growth rate between the
forecast with a constant asset policy and Reverse QE II implied by the median forecasts for December 2024.
The bracketed values are the 90 percent posterior for the annualized forecast differential. The first two
models conditionally forecast the four variable of interest with the assumption that the future Securities Held
Outright levels are a fixed commitment by the Federal Reserve. The last three models conduct conditional
forecast inference using Waggoner and Zha (1999) forecast error restriction, which assumes the Federal
Reserve projected path of Reverse QE is non-credible. Each month, the path restricted level of security
holdings constitutes a shock (identified recursively or with sign restrictions) relative to the level implied by
the unconditional forecast level of security holdings for that month.
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Chapter 2
Greenspan didn’t cause the Great
Recession: Examining Federal Reserve
Chairmen Deviations from the Taylor
Rule
2.1 Introduction
Since the end of the inflationary episode in the 1970s, the U.S. has experienced a significant
reduction in the volatility of GDP growth (with the exception of the 2008 recession) and only a
moderate amount of yearly inflation. There has, unsurprisingly, been a large amount of empirical
research to assess why economic conditions have changed so dramatically. A possible explanation
is that the U.S. Federal Reserve has changed the decision-making process that decides the federal
funds rate. Consequently, there is a large amount of interest in modeling the process by which this
decision is made and knowing whether this process has changed over time.
The clear winner of various efforts to model the decision-making process of the Federal Reserve
on the question of the federal funds rate is the ’Taylor Rule’. Presented initially by Taylor at the 1992
Carnegie-Rochester Conference as an empirical regularity rather than a theoretical conjecture, the
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descriptive power of the simple rule gradually has transformed the formula into a policy prescrip-
tion, particularly by Taylor himself. The original rule from Taylor (1993) stipulates that the federal
funds rate, rt, should be set in response to the output gap (the difference between nominal output,
Yt, and potential output, Yt∗), the target federal funds rate, r*, and the inflation gap (the difference
between the observed inflation, pit, the estimated equilibrium real interest rate, pi∗) according to
it = r ∗+pit + λ1(Yt − Yt∗) + λ2(pit − pi∗). (2.1)
Including Taylor’s suggestion for the parameter values and targets the rule becomes
it = 2 + pit + 0.5(Yt − Yt∗) + 0.5(pit − 2). (2.2)
Taylor (2007, 2009) used his rule to argue that monetary policy was “too loose” from 2003 to
2006 compared to the experience of the previous few decades and played a role in the formation of
the housing bubble by making housing finance cheap and attractive and contributing to a boom-bust
in housing starts. Orphanides and Wieland (2008), however, conclude that policy actions from 1988
to 2007 (Greenspan’s tenure) have been consistent with a stable Taylor rule. Mehra and Sawhney
(2010) also find the gap between the federal funds rate and the Taylor rule recommendation in 2003-
2006 disappears when a forward-looking Taylor rule using real-time inflation and unemployment
data is applied.
The paper identifies regime changes in U.S. monetary policy over the 40 year period 1965-
2008, based on the consistency of the federal funds rate with the Taylor Rule. This also answers the
question of whether the Greenspan era was unusually “loose” relative to the historical deviance of
monetary policy from the Taylor Rule.
I perform a data-based determination of regime changes in U.S. monetary policy, relying on
only the statistical properties of the deviation series to determine if the deviations from the Taylor
Rule are systematic over certain periods. I employ a standard non-forward- looking version of
Taylor’s (Taylor, 1993, 1999) decision model of the federal funds rate, the version of the Taylor
Rule suggested by the St. Louis Federal Reserve (equation 2), where the potential GDP series
comes from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) model potential GDP in the U.S. I focus on the
issue of whether there have been regime changes in U.S. monetary policy over the 50 year period
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1965- 2008, based on the consistency of the federal funds rate with the Taylor Rule.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses previous regime identification
literature. Section 3 reviews the Taylor Rule and the construction of deviation series with the data
available to the Fed at the time of their decisions. Section 4 discusses the empirical regime detection
methodology, Section 5 presents the empirical results, and Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Previous Literature
The standard approach to studying regime changes is to examine various different regimes
separately; for example, Fair (2001) treats the period of October 1979-July 1982, when the Fed
experimented with targeting money growth rates, as one regime and the periods before and after as
separate regimes. A difficulty with this approach is that the various policy regimes have to be Al-
ternatively, one might consider the terms of Fed chairmen as defining different regimes (e.g., Judd
and Rudebusch, 1998, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 1998, 2000, Taylor, 1999).
A typical method is to choose regime dates based on some known features and history of the
available data and then use tests of parameter constancy, e.g., Chow tests, to justify the dates cho-
sen. However, as Hansen (2001) observes, if the breakpoints are not known a priori, then the
Chi-squared critical values for the Chow test are inappropriate. Using known features of the data
(e.g., the Volker policy experiment of 1979-82) to determine breakpoints can make these candidate
break dates endogenously correlated with the actual data-leading to incorrect inferences about the
significance of those candidate break dates. Furthermore, not all of the parameters or targets nec-
essarily change at the same date. Fitting values to the policy parameters on the output and inflation
gap, λ1 and λ2 in equation (1), with an OLS model, such as
it = α+ β1(Yt − Y ∗) + β2(pit − pi∗) + t, (2.3)
provides less than reliable parameter estimates if the regime include little data, as in the case with
potential Volker policy experiment.
Boivin (2006) deals with some of these issues by using a Time-Varying Parameter model
that assumes that the policy parameters are time series which follow drift-less random walks. This
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is the Kalman filter model of Cooley and Prescott (1976), and all of the parameters in the model can
be estimated jointly by maximum likelihood estimation. However, when the variance of the policy
parameter time series is found to be small, the parameters can only change slowly over time and
policy regime shifts are not visible. Boivin (2006) deals with this problem in an ad hoc manner,
but still does not identify discrete regimes that agree with the terms of particular Federal Reserve
Chairmen. He finds only a gradual shift in the Taylor rule policy parameters until around 1982, the
start of the Great Moderation.
2.3 Data
The federal funds rate, inflation, unemployment, and output time series come from the U.S.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ FRED database. The potential output series in the initial Taylor
rule comes from the Congressional Budget Office and is imported by the St. Louis Federal Reserve.
The series run from quarterly for 54 years from 1954:Q3-2008:Q4.
Figure 2.1: St. Louis Fed Taylor rule
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Notes: The figure shows the federal funds rate (red), along with the implied federal funds rate from the
original formulation of the Taylor Rule (blue), as calculated by The St. Louis Federal Reserve. The vertical
bars denote recessions as defined by the NBER. Both series are based on quarterly data, with the federal
funds rate data points representing the quarterly average of the effective federal funds rate.
Plotting the difference between the federal funds rate and the rate from the St. Louis Taylor
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Rule, iFedFund,t − iSt.Louis,t , in Figure 2, it is clear the difference series is not stationary (we
cannot reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity using a unit root test), and is negatively biased
(mean = -0.93 %), so even though the Taylor rule visually fits the actual federal funds rate series
well, the federal funds rate is not completely consistent with the single Taylor rule over the entire
period.
Figure 2.2: iFedFund,t − iTaylor,t: 1954-2008
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Notes: The figure shows the difference between the quarterly average federal funds rate, iFedFund and the
federal funds rate implied by the Taylor rule, iTaylor. The series is quarterly from 1954:Q3 to 2008:Q1.
Since the difference series is both biased and non-stationary, it follows that there is a non-
random effect from the particular policymaker on the deviation of federal funds rate from the Taylor
rule.
2.3.1 Real Time Taylor Rule
The Taylor Rule assumes that policymakers know, and can agree on, the size of the output gap.
In fact, measuring the output gap is very difficult and FOMC members typically have different judg-
ments. In addition, the FOMC meets eight times per year, so assessing the Taylor rule consistency
of the FOMC using quarterly data could be misleading. It is fairer to assess the consistency of the
federal funds rate with Taylor rule using monthly data that was available to the committee at the
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time of their meeting. Instead of attempting to interpolate quarterly output and potential output data
with a method similar to Sims (1980), I choose to approximate the output gap using Okun’s law,
Yt − Yt∗ = −c(Ut − Ut∗). (2.4)
Equation (4) is the gap version of Okun’s ’rule of thumb’ as presented in Abel and Bernanke (2005).
For the period of 1954-2008, the slope of the line is -1.4 (Figure 3). This suggests that the Taylor
rule on a monthly frequency is
it = 2 + pit + 0.5(−1.26(Ut − Ut∗)) + 0.5(pit − 2). (2.5)
This version of the Taylor rule also has the advantage of being able to use the historical values of
inflation and unemployment values that were the estimates at the time of the FOMC meeting, rather
than the revised series. This data is available from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s
Real-Time Data Set from 1965 onward.
Assuming a natural unemployment rate, U∗ of 5.5%, the implied “real-time” Taylor rule is
it = 2 + pit − 0.63(Ut − 5.5) + 0.5(pit − 2). (2.6)
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Figure 2.3: Gap Version of Okun’s Law 1954-2008
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Notes: The figure shows the results regression based on equation 2.4, regressing the Output gap on the
Unemployment gap using quarterly Output and Unemployment. The estimated slope for the period is -1.26,
rather that the -2 estimated from Ukun’s original data.
Figure 2.4: Real-Time iFedFund,t − iSt.Louis,t, 1965-2008
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Notes: The figure shows the difference between the monthly average federal funds rate, iFedFund and the
federal funds rate implied by the monthly version of the Taylor rule, iTaylorMontly , in equation 2.6. The in-
flation and unemployment estimates are the initial series available at the time of the Federal Reserve meeting,
acquired from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Real-Time Data Set, rather than the revised series
published by St. Louis Federal Reserve. The series runs from February 1965 to December 2007.
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This use of this Taylor rule leads to the data series in Figure 4, 507 monthly data points from
1965-2008. The Taylor rule residual series is still biased (mean = -1.25 %) toward a higher interest
rate than the Taylor rule suggests (i.e. a bias toward less permissive monetary policy). The ’Real-
Time’ series is obviously much closer to being stationary but is still not consistent with the single
Taylor rule over the entire period.
In February 2000, the CPI was replaced by the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) de-
flator measure of inflation and from July 2004 onward inflation forecasts employed the core PCE
deflator that excludes food and energy prices. As Mehra and Sawhney (2010) point out, this reduces
much of the apparent Greenspan deviation from the Taylor Rule from 2003 to 2006.
2.4 Empirical Methodology
The Tukey Honest Significant Difference Test is a single-step multiple comparison procedure
to find if sample means are signficanly different from each other simultaneously. The test assumes
that the observations are independt with and among the groups and there is homgeneous within-
group variance across the groups. Since I first wish to first test whether Greenspan’s tenure is
distinguishable from the other Fed Chairmen on an aggregate basis, this is a suitable procedure to
perform before attempting to identify regimes with an agnostic statistical prodecure.
The CUSUM test of Brown, Durbin, and Evans (1975) is based on recursive residuals from a
simple AR(1) fitted model finds evidence of structural breaks. It is easiest to judge the break points,
however, using the multiple mean model, even though there is autocorrelation in the federal funds
rate -Taylor rule difference series. It is also perhaps most useful to think of the FOMC monetary
policy having an unbiased error in relation to the Taylor rule in each regime. Using this assumption
and using the methodology of Bai and Perron (1998), if I fit multiple mean equations to the series
and choose the points in time that minimize the residual sum of squares for the chosen number
of breakpoints. The optimal number of breakpoints is three, based on the Schwartz Information
Criterion (SIC).
Another useful way to find the hidden regimes in monetary policy is with the Markov switch-
ing model of Hamilton (1989), one of the most popular nonlinear time series models in the literature.
This model involves multiple structures (equations) that can characterize the time series behaviors
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in different regimes. By permitting switching between these structures, this model is able to capture
more complex dynamic patterns. A novel feature of the Markov switching model is that the switch-
ing mechanism is controlled by an unobservable state variable that follows a first-order Markov
chain. In particular, the Markovian property regulates that the current value of the state variable de-
pends on its immediate past value. As such, a structure may prevail for a random period of time, and
it will be replaced by another structure when a switching takes place. This is in sharp contrast with
the random switching model of Quandt (1972) in which the events of switching are independent
over time. The original Markov switching model focuses on the mean behavior of variables. This
model and its variants have been widely applied to analyze economic and financial time series; see
e.g., Hamilton (1988, 1989), Engel and Hamilton (1990), Lam (1990), Garcia and Perron (1996),
Goodwin (1993), Diebold, Lee and Weinbach (1994), Engel (1994), Filardo (1994), Ghysels (1994),
Sola and Driffill (1994), Kim and Yoo (1995), Schaller and van Norden (1997), and Kim and Nelson
(1998), among many others.
Let st denote the unobservable state variable. The switching model for the Taylor Rule deviation
(iTaylor) series I consider involves three regimes.
iTaylor =

α0 + t, t ∼ N(0, σ21), st = 0
α1 + t, t ∼ N(0, σ22), st = 1
α2 + t, t ∼ N(0, σ23), st = 2.
(2.7)
This model could be thought of a representing three states of monetary policy relative to the
Taylor Rule, where “tight”, “loose”, and “other” are three hidden states which each st might rep-
resent. This formulation allows for the presence of different conditional variances across regimes,
and so is a less restrictive version of the methodology of Bai and Peron.
When st are independent Bernoulli random variables, it is the random switching model of
Quandt (1972). In the random switching model, the realization of st is independent of the pre-
vious and future states. This would imply that the deviation from the Taylor rule would belong
to one of several regimes randomly, which is not consistent with the concept of the hidden state
being the particular Fed chairman, who is likely not changing policy stances from month to month
randomly. Suppose instead that st follows a first-order Markov chain with the following transition
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matrix:
P =

p00(st = 0|st−1 = 0) p01(st = 1|st−1 = 0) p02(st = 2|st−1 = 0)
p10(st = 0|st−1 = 1) p11(st = 1|st−1 = 1) p12(st = 2|st−1 = 1)
p20(st = 0|st−1 = 2) p21(st = 0|st−1 = 2) p22(st = 2|st−1 = 2)
 (2.8)
where pij (i,j = 0,1,2) denote the transition probabilities of st = j given that st−1 = i so that
the transition probabilities satisfy pi0 + pi1 + pi2 = 1. The transition probabilities determine the
persistance of each regime.
2.5 Results
Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 show that regardless of what form of the Taylor Rule is used, Greenspan’s
Federal Reserve Chairmanship is signficiantly closer to the Taylor Rule in aggregate than any other
chairman before him. Only Bernanke from 2005-2008 is indistinguishable from Greenspan.
Figure 2.5: Fitted Regimes with Fed Chairmen tenure periods, 1965-2008
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Notes: The figure shows the monthly series representing the monthly deviation from the Taylor Rule (green),
along with the condition means from the Bai and Perron structural break methodology. The tenure of each
Federal reserve chairmen are represented by the shaded background regions. Martin (pink), Burns (salmon),
Volker (yellow), Greenspan (tan), Bernanke (light blue), and Yellen (dark blue) are denoted. Vertical grey
bars represent the NBER recession periods.
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The federal funds rate-Taylor Rule difference series with separate means fit for each regime
is shown in Figure 2.5. The first regime of the Bai and Peron’s statistical procedure identifies covers
the chairmanship tenures of William Martin (1951-1970) and Arthur Burns (1970-1978), from the
start of series until 1973. This is a period of very loose monetary policy, perhaps influenced by
President Nixon’s threats of taking away Federal Reserve independence. Burns’ monetary policy
under the Ford presidency after the breakpoint in 1973 was even looser and less consistent with the
Taylor rule. The second breakpoint in 1980 is somewhat expected -it agrees with the drifting output
and inflation gap evidence from Boivin (2006). The chairmanship of Paul Volker (1979-1987) shows
a clear breakpoint in Taylor rule consistency to a regime of tight monetary policy in November of
1980 until the end of tenure, an unsurprising result given that 1979-1982, the Federal Reserve
targeted non-borrowed reserve levels rather than the federal funds rate. The high interest rate period
continued until the end of Volker’s tenure in 1987, as the Fed continued to battle stagflation with by
first taming inflation (an emphasis on the inflation gap over the output gap in the standard Taylor
rule).
Alan Greenspan’s tenure from 1987-2006 was remarkably consistent with the Taylor Rule, re-
gardless of if the shift from targeting core CPI to core PCE in 2000 is reflected in the Taylor Rule.
The conditional mean deviation of Greenspan’s tenure is approximately zero, in either case, as Fig-
ures 2.5 and 2.6 show.
The less restrictive Markov-Switching regime structure finds periods of more and less adherence
to the Taylor Rule. In some periods, he is indeed classified in the “loose” regime, as shown in
Figure 2.9, the rest of his regime has a conditional mean greater than zero (“tight”). However, it is
important to note that the conditional standard deviation of both the “tight” (conditional deviation
mean greater than zero) and “loose” (conditional deviation mean less than zero) periods is that
the conditional standard deviation in both regimes is similar (0.722 vs. 0.764). This shows that
Greenspan was symetric in his deviations from the Taylor Rule, in addition to being cyclical.
The Markov-Switching model classifies Volker and Burns in the same regime, despite their
obviously different mean deviations from the Taylor Rule (Figure 2.8). The conditional variance of
this regime is quite high, however, so Regime 2 in the Markov-Switching model can be interpreted
as monetary policy regime inconsistent with the Taylor Rule, either very tight or very loose.
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Figure 2.6: Fitted Regimes using PCE rather than CPI inflation target from 2000 to 2008
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Notes: The figure shows the monthly series representing the monthly deviation from the Taylor Rule (green)
corrected for the use of PCE as the preferred measure of inflation beginning in 2000, along with the condition
means from the Bai and Perron structural break methodology (brown). The tenure of each Federal Reserve
chairmen are represented by the shaded background regions. Martin (pink), Burns (salmon), Volker (yellow),
Greenspan (tan), Bernanke (light blue), and Yellen (dark blue) are denoted. Vertical grey bars represent the
NBER recession periods.
Figure 2.7: Markov Switching: Regime 1
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Notes: The figure shows the periods corresponding to the first Markov switching regime conditional mean
and variance for the deviations from the Taylor Rule. The fitted conditional mean and standard deviation are
0.358 and 0.722, respectively. This regime can be interpreted as “tight” regime, where the federal funds rate
is higher than the recommendation from the Taylor Rule.
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Figure 2.8: Markov Switching: Regime 2
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Notes: The figure shows the periods corresponding to the second Markov switching regime conditional mean
and variance for the deviations from the Taylor Rule. The fitted conditional mean and standard deviation
are -1.546 and 4.930, respectively. This regime can be interpreted as a non-standard regime, periods where
monetary policy substantially deviates from the Taylor rule. The period covers the Burns chairmanship
keeping monetary policy loose at Nixon’s behest, and the Volker chairmanship keeping monetary policy
tighter than recommended due to the emphasis on fighting inflation over boosting output during his tenure .
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Figure 2.9: Markov Switching: Regime 3
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Notes: The figure shows the periods corresponding to the third Markov switching regime conditional mean
and variance for the deviations from the Taylor Rule. The fitted conditional mean and variance are -1.856 and
0.764, respectively. This regime can be interpreted as “loose” regime, where the federal funds rate is lower
than the recommendation from the Taylor Rule.
For estimated conditional means and variance for the model in equation 2.7 are
iTaylor =

0.358 + t, t ∼ N(0, 0.722), st = 0
−1.546 + t, t ∼ N(0, 4.930), st = 1
−1.856 + t, t ∼ N(0, 0.764), st = 2.
(2.9)
and the estimated transition matrix is
P =

0.968 0.007 0.025
0.014 0.981 0.007
0.019 0.012 0.969
 (2.10)
2.6 Conclusion
The first part of Alan Greenspan’s tenure, from 1988 to the end of 2000 is exceptionally con-
sistent with real-time Taylor Rule(series mean of zero), with the federal fund rate in a low variance
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oscillation about the prescription of the Taylor rule in any given month. While the second part of
Greenspan’s Federal Reserve leadership was char acterized by a policy that appeared to be looser
than that suggested by the Taylor rule, the conditional mean found by the Bai and Peron structural
break process is still consistent across his tenure. The Markov switching regime classified the con-
tentious 2003 as “loose” regime, but also not recognizably different than the two earlier “loose”
periods during his tenure, or most of Martin’s chairmanship during the late 1960s. In fact, based
on the ANOVA regression in Table 2.1, Greenspan had a tighter adherence to the Taylor Rule than
Martin overall.
It is difficult to conclude that the interest rate policies under Ben Bernanke (2005-2008) were in-
consistent at all with the Taylor rule for the three years which the federal funds rate was the primary
monetary policy tool during his tenure. The federal funds rate was at zero for most of Bernanke’s
tenure and could not go any lower even if the Taylor rule suggested a negative interest rate policy.
Unconventional Monetary Policy in the form of Quantitative Easing makes arguments about Taylor
rule consistency irrelevant past 2008. Bernanke himself suggested that he placed a larger emphasis
on output rather than inflation than the traditional Taylor Rule. Regardless, his interest rate policies
were broadly consistent with the Taylor Rule.
The contention by Taylor (2007,2009) that Greenspan inflated the housing bubble is inconsistent
with a historical inspection of Federal Reserve deviations from the Taylor Rule. Greenspan had
a condition mean deviation of zero throughout his tenure, assuming a constant level of variance
with the Bai and Peron(2003) A less restrictive Markov-Switching model finds that some periods
of Greenspan’s tenure corresponded to “loose” monetary policy, but the conditional variance was
extremely close for both the “loose” and “tight” Markov-switching regimes as Equation 2.9 shows.
To the extent that Greenspan deviated from the Taylor Rule, he deviated in a cyclical, symmetric
manner. Negative deviations were offset by positive deviations from the Taylor Rule, which is in-
consistent with Taylor’s argument that the period of 2003-2006 differed from what economic agents
had come to expect of monetary policy, and thus fueled the housing bubble. Greenspan was never
classified in the same regime as the notoriously low interest rate tenure of Arthur Burns regardless
of methodology.
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Table 2.1: Tukey HSD:St. Louis Rule
Difference Lower Upper P-value
Bernanke-Greenspan -0.835 -1.703 0.034 0.069
Burns-Greenspan -2.990 -3.861 -2.118 0
Martin-Greenspan -1.218 -2.309 -0.127 0.017
Miller-Greenspan -4.450 -6.198 -2.701 0
Volker-Greenspan 2.568 1.696 3.439 0
Burns-Bernanke -2.155 -3.182 -1.128 0.00000
Martin-Bernanke -0.383 -1.602 0.835 0.968
Miller-Bernanke -3.615 -5.446 -1.785 0.00000
Volker-Bernanke 3.402 2.375 4.429 0
Martin-Burns 1.772 0.551 2.992 0.0004
Miller-Burns -1.460 -3.292 0.372 0.219
Volker-Burns 5.557 4.528 6.587 0
Miller-Martin -3.232 -5.178 -1.286 0.00002
Volker-Martin 3.785 2.565 5.006 0
Volker-Miller 7.017 5.185 8.849 0
Notes: The table shows the results of the Tukey Honest Significant Difference multiple comparison procedure
for testing the difference in mean Federal Reserve Chairman deviance from the original version of the Taylor
Rule. Greenspan has a signficantly tighter adherance to the Taylor Rule than every former Chairman other
than Bernanke.
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Table 2.2: Tukey HSD: Bernanke Rule
Difference Lower Upper P-value
Bernanke-Greenspan 0.297 -0.636 1.231 0.965
Burns-Greenspan -2.475 -3.412 -1.538 0
Martin-Greenspan -2.341 -3.513 -1.168 0.00000
Miller-Greenspan -4.222 -6.101 -2.342 0
Volker-Greenspan 3.974 3.037 4.911 0
Burns-Bernanke -2.773 -3.876 -1.669 0
Martin-Bernanke -2.638 -3.948 -1.328 0.00000
Miller-Bernanke -4.519 -6.487 -2.551 0
Volker-Bernanke 3.676 2.573 4.780 0
Martin-Burns 0.135 -1.178 1.447 1.000
Miller-Burns -1.747 -3.716 0.223 0.121
Volker-Burns 6.449 5.342 7.556 0
Miller-Martin -1.881 -3.973 0.211 0.110
Volker-Martin 6.314 5.002 7.627 0
Volker-Miller 8.196 6.226 10.165 0
Notes: The table shows the results of the Tukey Honest Significant Difference multiple comparison procedure
for testing the difference in mean Federal Reserve Chairman deviance from the Bernanke version of the
Taylor Rule. ance from the original version of the Taylor Rule. Again, Greenspan has a significantly tighter
in adherence to the rule than every former Chairman besides Bernanke.
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Chapter 3
Long-run and Short-run Volatility in
Bitcoin’s Price
3.1 Introduction
Bitcoin is a digital currency introduced by Satoshi Nakamoto (possibly a pseudonym) which became
fully operational in January 2009. The volatility of Bitcoin exchange rates has gained a great deal of
attention since its creation. One of the reasons for Bitcoin’s volatility may be its short existence and
the fact that only a portion of bitcoins have been mined so far. Consequently, the price of bitcoin
can be influenced even by a comparatively small maount of activity by speculators or noise traders.
Events like bankruptcy of Mt. Gox, shutdown of Silk Road or negative statements about Bitcoin
from representatives of the People’s Bank of China also play a very important role. The increase
in the price since 2010 level, if it is not a transitory increase, reflects Bitcoin’s actual or expected
success and is a good thing.
Analyzing the volatility of BTC/USD exchange rate is also interesting due to the fact that Bit-
coin exchanges operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. That differentiates Bitcoin market from
other global financial exchanges such as NASDAQ or NYSE, which are open only within stated
time frame (Waring 2014). It seems best to separate short-term and long-term volatility to get an
impression of the volatility of Bitcoin compared to other assets.
Figure 3.1 shows the log price of Bitcoin in the Coinbase exchange compared to other currencies
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and assets. The data underlying this figure are all the prices at which bitcoins were exchanged at
Coinbase. Here, there is variation at a lower frequency than daily and this variation and some
variation above the daily frequency is likely to be more of a concern as excessive volatility.
Figure 3.1: Log Scale Price Level
Notes: The figure shows the daily log price level for various currency pairs and assets. Bitcoin/Currency pairs
have a high appreciation in general.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 compares the volatility of Bitcoin to
other currencies and assets. Section 3 summarizes possible volatility decompositions. Section 4
decomposes the volatiltity of Bitcoin into long and short-run components. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Volatility of Bitcoin
It is natural to compare Bitcoin volatility to some currencies which are thought of as safe-haven
currencies, namely the U.S. Dollar (USD), Japanese Yen (JPY), and Swiss Franc (CHF). Conversely,
it is informative to compare these relatively stable currencies to currencies which have recently
undergone some high inflation episodes, namely the Venezuelan Bolivar (VEB), and the Argentine
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peso (ARS). All rates are relative to the U.S. Dollar, except for the dollar, which is relative to the
Euro (EUR).
Since the official Venezuelan Bolivar exchange rates and the black market exchange rates dif-
fer by a wide degree, we use the parallel black market exchange rate for VEB/USD reported on
the website DolarToday*. The website is headquartered in Miami, Florida and run by expatriate
Venezuelan citizens. The prices are based on operations in the city of Cucuta, on the Venezuelan
border†. The Argentine peso (ARS) exchange rate comes from Investing.com.
Bitcoin and gold have some key similarities, both are speculative investments that have been
thought of as “safe-haven” assets. Gold has been thought of as a safe haven asset for a long time,
but Bitcoin can possibly be seen as a safe-haven financial asset as well, since the price has reacted
in positively in relation to negative geo-political news‡. We use the daily 3pm (London time) fixing
price of gold in U.S. Dollars from the FRED database (GOLDPMGBD228NLBM).
3.2.1 Volatility Calculation
Monthly realized variance is calculated as the sum of the squared daily returns for a given month,
and realized volatility is calculated as the square root of the realized variance, i.e.
RVt =
√√√√ d∑
i=1
r2i , (3.1)
where d is the number of days in a month. Linearly detrended realized volatility is calculated by
linearly de-trending the log price and then computing the variance of that detrended price as well as
the variance of original series.
*http://dolartoday.com
†Pardo, Daniel (January 23, 2014). How and who calculate the parallel dollar in Venezuela? . BBC
World . Retrieved on May 27, 2018
‡https://www.thestreet.com/story/14285619/1/is-bitcoin-stealing-gold-s-safe-haven-status.html
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Figure 3.2: Monthly Realized Volatility
Notes: The figure shows the realized volatility calculated monthly for various currency pairs and assets.
Bitcoin/Currency pairs have high monthly volatility in general.
3.3 Short-run and Long-run Variance Decompositions
3.3.1 Changes in Mean Over Time
Computing realized volatility with a changing mean each month is a way of allowing for changes
in the mean return and its effect on volatility. Represent the series as and random walk with a
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time-varying drift
yt = µt + yt−1 + t (3.2)
We have not specified a process of µt. If yt is the logarithm of the price, the log return rt = yt−yt−1
can be represented as
rt = µt + t (3.3)
Realized volatility is computed using daily data for each month. Let t represent the month and add
a subscript i for each day of the month, with i = 1, . . . Ti. Then
mt =
∑Ti
i=1 rt,i
Ti
(3.4)
wher mt is the mean for the month. Given the computation, Emt = µt is the parameter for
which mt is an estimator. Realized variance for month t is
s2t =
∑Ti
i=1(rt,i −mt)2
Ti − 1 (3.5)
where s2t is the realized variance for the month. Given the computation, Es
2
t = σ
2
t if σ
2
t is the
parameter for which s2t is an estimator.
It is possible to decompose the overall variance into compoonents based on deviations of the
mean over time and deviation from the monthly means§. Let
TSSi =
Ti∑
i=1
(rt,i −mt)2. (3.6)
Also let
TSS =
T∑
t=1
Ti∑
i=1
(rt,i −m)2. (3.7)
TSS has deviations for the overall meanm and TSSi has deviations from the mean each period
mt. TSS can be rewritten
§This is basically an analysis of variance computation
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TSS =
T∑
t=1
Ti∑
i=1
(rt,i −m)2
=
T∑
t=1
Ti∑
i=1
(rt,i −mt +mt −m)2
The term (rt,i −mt +mt −m)2 can be rewritten
(rt,i −mt +mt −m)2 = (rt,i −mt)2 + (mt −m)2 + 2(rt,i −mt)(mt −m). (3.8)
The last term summed (with the 2 suppressed) is
TSS =
T∑
t=1
Ti∑
i=1
(rt,i −mt)(mt −m)
=
T∑
t=1
(mt −m)
Ti∑
i=1
(rt,i −mt)
because
∑Ti
i=1(rt,i −mt) = 0 for all i which follows from
Ti∑
i=1
(rt,i −mt)
=
Ti∑
i=1
rt,i −
Ti∑
i=1
mt
=Timt − Timt
=0.
The bottom line is that it is possible to decompose the variance into variation around the monthly
means and variation in the monthly means over time. A month is an arbitrary period, but it is
neither too long nor too short to be interesting as for computing short-run variation. This can be
seen because equaiton (3.7) becomes
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TSS =
T∑
t=1
(mt −m) + TSSi (3.9)
= TSSm + TSSi (3.10)
where TSSm is the total squared deviation for the monthly means around the overall mean.
3.3.2 The Local Linear Trend Model
Again, if yt is the logarithm of the price, and rt = yt− yt−1, the realized volatility in a given month
is
RVt =
√√√√ d∑
i=1
ri. (3.11)
Suppose we use the following model for the monthly realized volatility. This model is called
the “local linear trend” (Durbin and Koopman, 2012). It is given by
RVt = µt + t,  ∼ N(0, σ2 ) (3.12)
µt+1 = βt + µt + ηt, η ∼ N(0, σ2η) (3.13)
βt+1 = βt + ζt, ζ ∼ N(0, σ2ζ ). (3.14)
The state βt+1 represents thetrend in short-run realized volatility, while µt+1 represents latent level
of short-run realized volatility. All the disturbances in the model are independent at all lags and
leads. If σ2ζ = 0, the trend is a random walk with constant drift β1. If β1 = 0 the model reduces to
local level model. If σ2ζ > 0, but σ
2
η = 0, then the trend is a smooth curve, or and integrated random
walk. Given a vector of realized volatility RVt = (RV1, ..., RVT )′, we want to estimate the β’s and
µ’s and the variances of the innovations of the three components of the series. When filtering, the
purpose is to update the estimate of the state as each new observation arrives. This generates the
Kalman filtering updating equation.
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3.4 Variance Decompositions of Bitcoin
Table 3.1: Changes in Mean Decomposition
Asset TSSm/TSSx100 TSS1...t/TSSx100 TSSm TSS
Gold 0.270 % 99.730 % 0.0005 0.1963
USD/EUR 0.207 % 94.793 % 0.0001 0.577
JPY/USD 0.022% 99.978 % 0.162 726.039
CHF/USD 0.177 % 99.823 % 0.046 25.834
VEB/USD 0.236 % 99.764 % 0.004 1.557
ARS/USD 0.221 % 99.779 % 0.0003 0.1363
S&P 500 0.124 % 99.876% 0.0002 0.1411
BTC/USD 0.158 % 99.842 % 0.0124 7.7878
BTC/JPY 0.064 % 99.936 % 0.0121 8.860
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Figure 3.3: Change-in-Mean Volatility Decomposition
Notes: The figure shows the realized volatility calculated monthly for various currency pairs and assets.
Bitcoin/Currency pairs have high monthly volatility in general.
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Figure 3.4: Bitcoin Realized Volatility Trend Decomposition
Notes: The figure shows the monthly realized volatility for the Bitcoin/USD from Coinbase and Mt. Gox
from January 2011 to December 2018. The latent level in monthly realized volatility and time-varying trend
are also plotted.
3.5 Conclusion
Bitcoin in a volatile asset, both relative to other currencies and traditional “safe-haven” assets
such as gold. Like most currencies and assets in Table 3.1, the overwhelming majority of volatility
in Bitcoin is short-run volatility.Currently, Bitcoin prices remain highly volatile. However, as Figure
3.4 shows, the average level of short-run price volatility in Bitcoin has been declining since trading
began in 2011 on the Mt. Gox Bitcoin Exchange. This trend has important implications for the
usefulness of Bitcoin as a medium of exchange. Less price volatility would be better if Bitcoin is
going to be used as a medium in a signficant share of transactions. However, much of the interest in
Bitcoin as an alternative asset to date is due to the high level of volatility, and thus the possibility of
large investment returns.
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